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Objective: To determine the type and nature
of incidents occurring within medical imaging
settings in Australia and identify strategies
that could be engaged to reduce the risk of
their re-occurrence.
Methods: 71 search terms, related to clinical
handover and communication, were applied
to 3976 incidents in the Radiology Events
Register. Detailed classification and thematic
analysis of a subset of incidents that involved
handover or communication (n5298) were
undertaken to identify the most prevalent
types of error and to make recommenda-
tions about patient safety initiatives in
medical imaging.
Results: Incidents occurred most frequently
during patient preparation (34%), when
requesting imaging (27%) and when com-
municating a diagnosis (23%). Frequent prob-
lems within each of these stages of the
imaging cycle included: inadequate hand-
over of patients (41%) or unsafe or inappro-
priate transfer of the patient to or from
medical imaging (35%); incorrect informa-
tion on the request form (52%); and delayed
communication of a diagnosis (36%) or com-
munication of a wrong diagnosis (36%).
Conclusion: The handover of patients and
clinical information to and from medical imag-
ing is fraught with error, often compromising
patient safety and resulting in communication
of delayed or wrong diagnoses, unnecessary
radiation exposure and a waste of limited
resources. Corrective strategies to address
safety concerns related to new information
technologies, patient transfer and inadequate
test result notification policies are relevant
to all healthcare settings.
Advances in knowledge: Handover and com-
munication errors are prevalent in medical
imaging. System-wide changes that facilitate
effective communication are required.
Problems involving the communication and handover of
patient information are well documented [1–7], with in-
adequate communication identiﬁed as a contributing
factor in up to 70% of hospital sentinel events [1,2].
Handover is a vulnerable time for patients, with an in-
creased risk of discontinuity of care and adverse events
[8–10]. Communication failures such as delayed, mis-
placed or forgotten results or inaccurate or inadequate
handover of clinical information can result in adverse
patient outcomes, including unnecessary delays in the
diagnosis, treatment or communication of results and
incorrect treatment [11,12]. Poor handover of information
also results in considerable waste of limited resources [12].
Medical imaging is not exempt from these types of
errors. There is growing evidence that medical imaging
is prone to failures in communication, particularly the
communication of critical and non-critical test results
[13–15] and inadequate communication of patient in-
formation on the request form [16,17]. With increasing
complexities of care, technological advances in imaging
and electronic communication systems have seen new
types of errors emerging [18].
Review of incident data informs patient safety and can
improve the quality of care [19–21]. The Radiology
Events Register (RaER) commenced in 2006 and it
facilitates systematic data collection of incidents and dis-
crepancies in all areas of medical imaging. In 2010,
a multidisciplinary clinical interest group was convened to
examine incidents involving handover and communica-
tion within the RaER database. The aim of this study was
to identify where handover and communication incidents
occurred within the imaging cycle [22], what human
factors contributed to them and what strategies could be
engaged to reduce the risk of their re-occurrence.
METHOD
Definition of handover
The deﬁnition used by the National Patient Safety
Agency (NPSA) in the United Kingdom and adopted by
the Australian Medical Association [23] was adapted to
reﬂect the medical imaging environment. The revised
deﬁnition is:
Clinical handover involves the transfer of professional
responsibility and accountability for some or all
aspects of care for a patient or group of patients to
another person on a temporary or permanent basis.
Within medical imaging this involves speciﬁcally a two
way information exchange that ensures the communi-
cation of relevant, accurate, timely and concise
information to medical imaging from a referrer or
other clinical staff and the communication of in-
formation from medical imaging staff, back to referrers
and other clinical staff.
The RaER database
The RaER database allows voluntary reporting of
incidents (adverse events and near misses) occurring
within medical imaging in Australia and New Zealand.
Information is collected via free text narratives from
the following ﬁelds: what happened, what was the
outcome, contributing factors and prevention and
minimisation strategies. Demographic information
about the patient and the practice setting are also
collected. The system does not replace state- or
hospital-based incident reporting systems and it is
declared a quality activity by the Australian and New
Zealand Ministers for Health, therefore information
obtained is protected under their respective Healthcare
Acts [24,25].
The Advanced Incident Management System (AIMS) is
used to collect and classify the incidents [26]. At the
time of analysis, the RaER database contained almost
4000 incidents from a range of data sources: staff
working in medical imaging (mostly radiologists),
medico-legal (ML) cases, Australian radiation regula-
tory authority (RRA) data and State Health Department
(SHD) incidents. The incidents reviewed occurred be-
tween 2004 and 2010.
Clinical interest group
The clinical interest group contained health pro-
fessionals with experience working in or referring
patients to medical imaging and/or who had specialist
knowledge in patient safety. Ethics approval for the
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study was granted by a State Health Department—
Human Research Ethics Committee.
Incident identification
Figure 1 summarises the selection of incidents for
analysis. 71 search terms were deﬁned by the group and
used to search the narratives. Over 1500 (n51648)
potential handover incidents were identiﬁed following
brief examination of the narrative, with 20 of those
incidents being removed for interrater reliability test-
ing. The remaining incidents were carefully read and
analysed to conﬁrm that the incident involved a prob-
lem with handover in the context of the above deﬁni-
tion. Conﬁrmed incidents (n5950) were classiﬁed
according to (i) the stage of the imaging cycle [22]
where the incident occurred and (ii) the speciﬁc nature
of the incident. Incidents with insufﬁcient narrative
detail, duplicate reports and those that were not
handover related were excluded (n5678). Incidents
from the SHD (n5638) contained limited narrative
detail because of privacy constraints on the release of
their data, and only 100 of those incidents were retained
in the data set. All remaining data sources were in-
cluded in the analysis (n5412).
Incident analysis
Within the clinical interest group three subgroups were
formed, each assigned incidents to analyse according
to their area of expertise. Education on how to de-
construct an incident using the Generic Reference
Model [27] was provided to ensure consistency across
the three groups. A thematic analysis was conducted on
the responses for each data ﬁeld and prevalence rates
calculated as a percentage of the total number of
responses obtained for that data ﬁeld.
RESULTS
Source of incident and patient demographic details for
the three most prevalent stages of the imaging cycle
where incidents occurred and all their data combined
(n5298) are presented in Table 1. The majority of
incidents included in the analysis were reported by
radiologists (70%). Inpatients accounted for just over
half of the patient types (55%), and the majority of
incidents were reported from a public practice setting
(91%).
Problems occurred more frequently during patient
preparation (34%); at the time of request for medical
imaging (27%) and when communicating a diagnosis
(23%) (Table 2). Examples of incident narratives from
each of the most prevalent stages are included in Box 1.
Detailed thematic analysis was conducted on the three
most prevalent stages of the imaging cycle where inci-
dents occurred (n5346). A small number of incidents
from each of those stages contained insufﬁcient nar-
rative detail (n548) and were removed. The remaining
incidents (n566) were not analysed owing to insufﬁcient
prevalence. Interrater reliability testing produced a kappa
score of 0.7, indicating substantial agreement between
two reviewers.
Patient preparation
Problems associated with patient preparation were in-
adequate handover of the patient (n553, 41%) and unsafe
or inappropriate transfer of patients (n545, 35%) (Table 3).
Figure 1. Summary of the results of searching and
selecting incidents. ML, medico-legal; RRA, radiation
regulatory authority; SHD, State Health Department.
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Unsafe transfer of patients was common and posed con-
siderable risks to patient safety, with patients being trans-
ported without appropriate equipment (e.g. oxygen or
monitoring); by an inappropriately trained or qualiﬁed staff
member (e.g. enrolled nurses transporting patients with
patient controlled analgesia); in an inappropriate manner
(e.g. clinically unwell patients transported in wheelchairs
rather than in a bed); or the absence of trained staff at the
receiving end to adequately care for the patient.
There was an adverse outcome in over three quarters
of the patient preparation incidents (n5112, 80%),
such as patient complication, deterioration or ad-
mission to a special care unit in 14% of incidents
(n519). Procedures were delayed in 13% of the inci-
dents (n518) and patient safety was compromised
in 23% (n532), highlighting unsafe and hazardous
practices.
Request
Problems were identiﬁed with the content of the re-
quest form in over half of the request incidents (n553,
52%) (Table 3). Having several parallel referral systems
(paper-based, faxed and electronic) resulted in dupli-
cate paper request forms for the same procedure ar-
riving in medical imaging (sometimes days later) and
a second procedure scheduled and in some cases,
repeated.
Resources were wasted in almost one quarter of the
request incidents (n535, 24%), typically from imaging
the wrong patient or repeated imaging. This resulted in
Table 1. Demographic details for the three most prevalent stages of the imaging cycle where incidents occurred and











Radiologist reported 84 (65) 62 (61) 62 (93) 208 (70)
State Health Department 46 (35) 26 (26) 4 (6) 76 (26)
Radiation regulatory
authority
— 13 (13) — 13 (4)
Medico-legal — — — 1 (0)
Gendera
Female 31 (52) 41 (56) 22 (46) 94 (52)
Male 29 (48) 32 (44) 26 (54) 87 (48)
Broad age band (years)a
0–19 5 (11) 3 (5) 6 (14) 14 (9)
20–39 0 (0) 9 (14) 10 (24) 19 (12)
40–59 9 (19) 22 (34) 11 (26) 42 (27)
60–79 22 (47) 26 (40) 15 (36) 63 (41)
801 11 (23) 5 (8) — 16 (10)
Practice settinga
Private 4 (5) 9 (16) 3 (6) 16 (9)
Public 73 (95) 49 (84) 48 (94) 170 (91)
Patient typea
Inpatient 40 (78) 31 (63) 8 (19) 79 (55)
Non-inpatient 7 (14) 13 (27) 28 (65) 48 (34)
Other 4 (8) 5 (10) 7 (16) 16 (11)
aInformation pertaining to these demographics is not available in incident narrative for all incidents.
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unnecessary imaging and radiation exposure (n531;
21%) and delayed imaging (n527; 19%).
Communication of diagnosis
Delayed communication of a diagnosis (n524; 36%) or
communication of the wrong diagnosis (n524; 36%)
(Table 3) were the most common problems found, with
information technology (IT) system failures or mal-
functions (n510, 34%) and interpretation errors by
non-radiologists (n511; 61%) being the most common
problems identiﬁed.
Patient treatment, management or diagnosis was
delayed in over half (n542, 55%) of these incidents
and included ﬁve incidents of delayed diagnosis or
management of pulmonary embolus (PE), with patients
sent home prior to the release of the ﬁnal report
having to be recalled urgently when the PE was con-
ﬁrmed. There was delayed diagnosis of fractures in
10 incidents as a result of interpretation error by non-
radiologists in most cases (e.g. emergency staff or general
practitioners).
DISCUSSION
Our examination and classiﬁcation of incident data
pertaining to the Australian medical imaging setting
identiﬁed that incidents involving handover and com-
munication are prevalent during transfer of the patient
to and from medical imaging, at the time of requesting
imaging, and during communication of the diagnosis.
A summary of the key ﬁndings and recommendations
are included in Table 4.
These ﬁndings are supported by the literature. A study
conducted 20 years ago by Renfrew et al [28], which
examined 182 “problems” in medical imaging, was
presented at case conferences between 1986 and 1990
and noted similar problems to those we described. They
stated that sources of error had not changed and that
these included acquisition of an incorrect or incomplete
clinical history, errors in perception and communica-
tion errors [28]. It would appear that the nature of
errors in medical imaging have not changed over the
last two decades, not as a result of healthcare pro-
fessionals’ incompetence but as a result of ineffective
systems of care. The message in To Err is Human
remains highly relevant: that preventing death and
injury from medical errors requires dramatic, system-
wide changes “that make it hard for people to do the
wrong thing and easy for people to do the right thing”
[19,29].
Box 1. Narrative examples for the three most
prevalent stages of the imaging cycle where
incidents occurred
Patient preparation
Patient with suspected abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA)
rupture was sent for a CT scan. The patient collapsed on the
table and I had to a call code blue. One interesting aspect that
I wish to bring to your notice is that the patient was sent for
the scan unaccompanied despite having a high index of
suspicion for AAA.
Request
A consultant physician ordered an upper abdominal ultra-
sound on a patient with query cholangitis/abnormal liver in
the evening. The request was faxed to an unattended imaging
department. No direct communication with imaging staff
and no consultation occurred. The patient’s clinical state
deteriorated the following day and covering medical staff
contacted imaging to enquire about the ultrasound, after
noting the clinical deterioration and realising it had not been
performed.
Communication of diagnosis
The patient was admitted with a history of unconscious
collapse. CT angiogram scan of head was performed follow-
ing referral by the Neurologist. The CT scan was performed
in another section of the hospital. No communication oc-
curred with the radiologist in the other section and the CT
scan was not reported that day. The next day, the case was
found on the picture archiving and communications system,
resulting in delayed diagnosis of a cerebral aneurysm.
Table 2. Stage of the imaging cycle where handover
incidents occurred
Stage of imaging cycle where
handover incidents occurred
n (%)
Patient preparation 141 (34)
Request 112 (27)
Communication of diagnosis 93 (23)
Clinical question 30 (7)
Technical performance 11 (3)
Presentation/work-up images 9 (2)
Clinical action 9 (2)
Image interpretation 7 (2)
Total 412
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Table 3. Problems occurring within each of the three prevalent stages of the imaging cycle where incidents occurred
Problems within each of the three prevalent stages of the
imaging cycle (%)
Number of problems (%)
Patient preparation n5130
Inadequate handover n553 (41)a
Infectious state not handed over 15 (27)
Not performed/no handover provided 11 (20)
Inadequate/no post-procedure instructions communicated 8 (15)
Clinical history or condition incomplete/inadequate 6 (11)
Allergy not communicated 4 (7)
Inadequate/missing documentation 4 (7)
Pre-procedure requirements not communicated 3 (5)
Not advised of patient arrival 2 (4)
Incomplete/inadequate handover 1 (2)
Wrong patient handed over 1 (2)
Unsafe/inappropriate transfer n545 (35)a
No clinical escort 21 (35)
Transfer unsafe/inappropriate 13 (22)
Delayed transfer 6 (10)
No/missing documentation 6 (10)
Incorrect transfer policy 5 (8)
Excessive wait 3 (5)
Wrong patient/documentation transferred 3 (5)
Transfer policy inadequate 2 (3)
Equipment not provided 1 (2)
Request n5101
Problem with content of request form n553 (52)a
Requested for wrong patient 24 (45)
Incorrect/inadequate clinical details 10 (19)
Wrong side requested 5 (9)
Illegible handwriting 4 (8)
Patient preparation not communicated 4 (8)
Allergy not documented 2 (4)
Request misinterpreted 2 (4)
No referrer details 2 (4)
Incorrect or inappropriate test requested n514 (14)
Incorrect/inappropriate test requested 8 (57)
Test no longer clinically required 3 (21)
Test requested by incorrect person 2 (14)
Did not check previous results 1 (7)
(Continued)
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The question that remains to be answered is what
system changes can be made in the provision of medical
imaging services to address pervasive communication
errors?
Patient preparation
Our study conﬁrmed existing studies on the risk of
intrahospital transfers [30] and identiﬁed that the
preparation and transfer of patients to medical imaging
was fraught with error. The reduced availability of
personnel, equipment and monitoring away from the
controlled environment at the ward can be detrimental
to the patient [31,32] and the risk of complications
increases for patients requiring critical care [33,34].
Our ﬁndings offer further illumination on the lack
of communication between medical imaging and
inpatient wards that severely compromises patient
safety [35].
Muchwork is currently being undertaken to improve the
quality and the content of clinical handover [1–3,12];
however, transfers to medical imaging have not been
a speciﬁc focus, either because they are not considered
high risk or because there is a lack of research in this area
[36]. Standardised handover processes that are tailored
to speciﬁc clinical contexts are supported in the literature
and are now part of Australian National Safety and
Quality Health Service Standards to improve clinical
handover [37]. Our results provide evidence that a spe-
ciﬁc set of handover problems is prevalent in medical
imaging and a need exists for health services to develop
context-speciﬁc handover solutions to address them.
Another key ﬁnding of our study was the unsafe transfer
of patients to medical imaging. For example, critically
unwell or unstable patients were transported to medical
imaging without a nurse escort and without appropri-
ate equipment. Clinical handover strategies should be
Table 3. (Continued)
Problems within each of the three prevalent stages of the
imaging cycle (%)
Number of problems (%)
Duplicated request forms n512 (12)a
Two forms sent i.e. electronic and hard-copy 8 (67)
Same test requested by different team members/doctors 4 (33)
Communication of diagnosis n567
Communication of wrong result/diagnosis n524 (36)a
Interpretation error 18 (69)
Acted on interim report 3 (11)
Inadequate cross-checking 2 (8)
Incorrect clinical correlation 1 (4)
Perception error 1 (4)
Incorrect content report 1 (4)
Delayed reporting/communication of result/diagnosis n524 (36)a
IT system failure/malfunction/availability 10 (34)
Delayed communication critical test result 8 (8)
Inadequate communication/follow-up in radiology 4 (14)
Film not reported/inappropriate time frame 3 (10)
Inadequate resources in radiology 1 (3)
Report not available 1 (3)
Result not communicated 1 (3)
Problems contacting referrer 1 (3)
aIncidents may be classified with more than one problem type (e.g. a transfer was unsafe because no clinical escort and no
documentation were provided) and the denominator may therefore be greater than or equal to the figure presented.
N Hannaford, C Mandel, C Crock et al
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extended to incorporate standards on the safe transfer of
patients, and transfer policies should address these risks.
Transfer of patients should be carefully planned and
include the “ﬁve rights of patient transfer” (Table 4).
Request
Request related problems included issues with the
content of the request form and inadequate commu-
nication between referrers and medical imaging staff.
Healthcare IT such as electronic ordering systems have
the potential to enable a dramatic transformation in the
delivery of healthcare, making it safer, more effective,
and more efﬁcient [38]. The ability of electronic sys-
tems to facilitate the timely exchange of information is
critical; however, technological advances that are not
well planned, tested and implemented can generate
known and introduce new types of errors [18].
The study ﬁndings demonstrate that overreliance on
IT systems to communicate accurate clinical informa-
tion into medical imaging can be unsafe. Electronic
referral and ordering systems must be reviewed and
forcing functions for critical data introduced. Clinical
decision support tools that provide recommendations
and protocols for appropriate imaging should be built
in to electronic request systems, thereby reducing the
number of inappropriate or incorrect tests requested
[39]. These could include checklists and automated
mandatory ﬁelds that require completion before a request
can be generated. These systems should not replace staff
checking procedures but supplement them to reduce the
amount of inappropriate or incorrect tests requested.
Communication of diagnosis
There is abundant information and research outlining
problems with the communication of diagnosis, par-
ticularly critical test result notiﬁcation and the sub-
sequent ML implications for radiologists [13–15,40–42].
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that delayed communi-
cation of a diagnosis and communication of the
wrong diagnosis were signiﬁcant problems. Prevention
strategies should be targeted at organisation-wide
tracking systems to facilitate the distribution and re-
ceipt of results with a method of ﬂagging and esca-
lating communication of urgent and time-critical
results. Policies regarding access to and release of
interim (unchecked and unauthorised and, therefore,
more likely to be subject to error) and ﬁnal reports and
Table 4. Summary of key findings and recommendations
Key findings Recommendations
Patient preparation
Inadequate handover of clinical information pertaining to patients
Adoption of and staff education on the Australian National Safety
and Quality Health Service Standards to improve clinical handover
[37]
Unsafe and inappropriate transfer of patients
Revision of handover and transfer policies to include the “ﬁve
rights of patient transfer”
(1) the right time
(2) the right patient
(3) the right equipment and documentation
(4) the right level of supervision and
(5) the right resources at the receiving end to adequately care for
the patient
Request
Problems with the content of the request form
Forcing functions for critical data should be embedded in all
information technology systems
Incorrect or inappropriate tests requested
Clinical decision support tools that provide recommendations and
protocols for appropriate imaging should be developed
Communication of diagnosis
Delayed communication of diagnosis
Organisation-wide tracking systems that facilitate the distribution
and receipt of results, with a method for ﬂagging urgent and time
critical results, are required
Communication of the wrong diagnosis
Policies regarding the release of interim, ﬁnal and addenda to
reports should be developed in line with technological advances
Handover errors in medical imaging
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addenda to reports must be developed or reviewed in
line with technological advances. If access to unau-
thorised reports is permitted, staff must be aware that
they have an obligation to check the ﬁnal report as this is
the report upon which treatment decisions must be made.
Effective communication between referrers and radi-
ologists is central to improving patient safety, and
radiologists must be alerted to the interpretation of
images made by other physicians so that errors and
discrepancies are detected and corrected. Finally,
referrers must ensure that they have actually received
and acted on the results for all tests requested.
Limitations
The RaER database is a voluntary system so there may
be biases in the types of incidents reported. Some
incidents have limited detail and most are from the
perspective of one person only. This does not reduce
the signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings in this paper. It does
mean that the prevalence of incidents in medical im-
aging is much higher than our data set would suggest
and that the results presented here may indeed be
skewed. For example, there was only one incident
where the content of the report was incorrect (4%)
when in fact other studies that have explored this
problem have found error rates of just over 20% [43].
The majority of incidents were reported from the
public setting and therefore may not reﬂect those oc-
curring in the private setting.
CONCLUSION
Incidents involving the handover of patients and patient
information are prevalent in medical imaging. Although
electronic systems have been touted as the panacea to
solve all problems, this has not been the case as known
error types have presented in new ways and new types
of error have emerged. To decrease these incidents, it is
important that system-wide changes to facilitate effec-
tive communication are made and that staff are edu-
cated about the importance of accurate and timely
communication and handover. Reducing error is im-
portant to improve patient care, promote professional
accountability, reduce unnecessary testing and prevent
the waste of limited resources.
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